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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their 
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They 
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”1 
 
Most employees would probably jump at the chance for their 
employers to provide and pay for a BlackBerry.2 The pocket-sized 
powerhouse keeps go-getters connected to work e-mails and the latest 
news via the Internet, and the deal seems even sweeter when the boss 
foots the bill. However, the circumstances surrounding this innocent little 
device are more insidious than employees may realize. While providing 
the opportunity to sneak out of work early and answer e-mails from the 
golf course, a piece of technology like the BlackBerry has further blurred 
already fuzzy lines separating the workplace from an individual’s 
personal world outside the office. Despite the ostensible benefits of 
employer-provided technology, such as laptops, cell phones and 
BlackBerries, this blurring has serious implications for employee 
expectations regarding privacy in communications sent on employer-
provided technology.  
A 2001 American Management Association study shed some light 
on the stark reality that employers monitor workplace technology 
without employee awareness.3  The study revealed that nearly 80 percent 
of surveyed large employers, who retain as much as a quarter of 
American workers, listened to employee phone conversations and 
voicemails, and read electronic files and e-mails.4 Additionally, as of 
2001, roughly 40 million American employees regularly use e-mail or 
access the Internet at work5 and, as of 2004, 20.7 million American 
                                                                                                             
 1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 2 The BlackBerry is a wireless handheld device introduced in 1999 as a two-way 
pager. In 2002, the more commonly known smartphone BlackBerry was released, which 
supports push e-mail, mobile telephone, text messaging, internet, faxing, web browsing 
and other wireless information services as well as a multi-touch interface. See generally 
Jennifer Lane, Note, NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.: Inventions Are Global, But 
Politics Are Still Local-An Examination of the BlackBerry Case, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
59 (2006).  
 3 AMA, Survey: Workplace Monitoring & Surveillance, Summary of Key Findings 
1 (2001). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Schulman, Andrew, The Extent of Systematic Monitory of Employee E-mail and 
Internet Use, Privacy Foundation July 9, 2001, available at 
http://diogenesllc.com/internetmonitoring.pdf. 
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employees “telecommute” from home.6 When considered alongside a 
1999 study showing that one in three workers surf the Internet for 
personal reasons during work hours,7 these statistics suggest that perhaps 
employees do not realize their communications on employer-provided 
laptops, cell phones and BlackBerries may be monitored for their 
content.8 
Indeed, these statistics indicate that employees may presume the 
Brandeis model of personal autonomy—the “right to be let alone”—
extends to all aspects of their lives, including communications sent on 
employer-provided technology.9  While employees may have an interest 
in maintaining some privacy at work, employers have conflicting 
interests in monitoring technology use to learn more about how 
employees utilize company time.10  Employers need to learn about the 
character and personality of the employee they hire in addressing 
potential and ongoing performance issues and ensuring the physical 
security of their workplace.11  Thus, employers may view electronic 
monitoring and other surveillance as necessary to ensure productivity, 
stop leaks of confidential information, and prevent workplace 
harassment.12  Moreover, employers must worry about the ever-present 
                                                                                                             
 6 Economic News Release: Work at Home in 2004, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/homey.nr0.htm. “Telecommuting” refers to when an 
“employee . . . works at home using telecommunications devices to provide a service.” 
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protection for Workers in Atypical Employment 
Relationships in the United States, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 270 (2006).  
 7 Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: The United 
States Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 474 (2002). 
 8 Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: The United 
States Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 474 (2002). 
 9 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, 
THE ETHICS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS 102 (Blackwell Publishing, 
2003). 
 10 See Rachel Sweeney Green, Comment, Privacy in the Government Workplace: 
Employees’ Fourth Amendment and Statutory Rights to Privacy, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 639 
(2005). 
 11 See generally Nicole Nyman, What Must Employers Do To Shield Against 
Liability For Employee Wrongdoings In the Internet Age?, 1 SHIDLER J. L. COM & TECH. 
7 (2005). 
 12 See TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 451 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002). These valid employer motives for surveillance comprise what a California 
Court of Appeals referred to as the “community norms” of the American business world, 
comprising an employer’s responsibility regarding legal compliance in regulated 
industries, legal liability, performance review, productivity measures, and security 
concerns. See also Smythe v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Jarrod J. 
White, Comment, E-Mail@Work.Com: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail, 48 
ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1997). 
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specter of litigation that hangs over the modern workplace.13  However 
invasive monitoring may seem, employers have legitimate motives to 
monitor employee conduct in the workplace.14  
If employers monitor communications on workplace technology 
and employees inadvertently divulge personal information, employees 
will often struggle to find any legal protection, as the American legal 
regime does not provide any generally applicable, affirmative protection 
for employee privacy.15 The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution does provide government employees some protection in the 
workplace,16 based on the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in 
O’Connor v. Ortega.17  However, the protections afforded to government 
employees by this framework are both limited and uncertain, in part due 
to the fact that the inquiry under the test for whether privacy exists is 
highly contextual.  The test for whether a public-sector employee has a 
workplace privacy right hinges on whether he enjoyed “reasonable 
expectations” of privacy based on the circumstances of his workplace.18 
Upon finding such an expectation, a court will then examine whether an 
employer’s search infringed upon that expectation, which depends on 
whether the search was reasonable in its inception and scope.19 As this 
Comment will address, the Court’s contextual methodology has allowed 
employers to alter workplace contexts with privacy policies that 
extinguish any employee privacy expectations in communications sent 
on workplace technology.  Crucially, these doctrinal requirements for 
analyzing whether an employee has a privacy expectation in his 
workplace make the Fourth Amendment a poor fit for providing much 
                                                                                                             
     13  See, e.g., Erin M. Davis, Comment, The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior: An 
Application to Employers’ Liability for the Computer or Internet Crimes Committed By 
Their Employees, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH., 683, 689 (2002) (examining how the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, which generally holds employers liable for the acts of 
their employees, complicates the legal responsibilities an employer must consider when 
providing technology to employees). 
 14 DE GEORGE, supra note 9, at 104. 
 15 See generally TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. 
SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 273–342  
(2007). See also Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 
(2006). 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”). 
 17 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 18 Id. at 714. 
 19 Id. at 724. 
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protection on technology such as computers, cell phones, and 
BlackBerries.20 
Moreover, because the Fourth Amendment only applies when the 
government acts, private-sector employees have no statutory federal 
protection.21 While the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(“EPPA”) protects against various kinds of electronic surveillance and 
interception of communications by public and private actors, including 
private-sector employers, this regime presents several potentially 
insurmountable hurdles for any employee who alleges his employer 
intercepted private communications on workplace technology.22 It does 
not provide meaningful protection for most employees because the law 
does not protect against interceptions by a service provider, who often 
doubles as the employer; the protections do not apply to interception by 
certain devices of communications made in the “ordinary course of 
business,” and the protections do not apply when one party to the 
communications consents to the interception.23 
Potential state-based protections are also limited. A few state 
constitutions, including California’s, provide potentially robust privacy 
rights for private-sector employees.24  Moreover, some states recognize 
common-law causes of action and have adopted statutory regimes that 
might protect employee privacy interests in some communications.25  Yet 
such protections are frequently limited and unavailable. 
Both the concern and conflict about communication privacy in the 
modern workplace are on dramatic display in Quon v. Arch Wireless, a 
controversial case decided by a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel in June 
                                                                                                             
 20 See generally Symposium, Orin Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1208, 1209 (2004). 
 21 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“This Court has . . . 
consistently construed [the Fourth Amendment] as proscribing only governmental action; 
it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a 
private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or 
knowledge of any governmental official.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 22 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2522 (2006).  
 23 GLYNN, supra note 15, AT 294. 
 24 CA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have 
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending . . . privacy.”). See also Hill 
v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Ca. 1994) (applying California Constitution to private 
employee’s claim of privacy invasion). 
 25 See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989) (stating 
that public policy under the state constitution protects an employee’s right to withhold 
private information from his employer and recognizing a cause of action for violations of 
that policy); Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing a 
cause of action for tortious “intrusion upon seclusion” in the workplace) 
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2008.26  In Quon, a public-sector employee, Jeff Quon, filed suit against 
his employer, alleging that his employer violated his rights under the 
Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution by reading his 
personal text messages sent on his employer-provided pager.27  In 
applying the Ortega test, the Ninth Circuit held that Quon had a 
reasonable privacy expectation in his pager messages.28  The court found 
that his expectation of privacy in the messages was reasonable even 
though the employer provided the pager and had a formal anti-privacy 
policy warning employees about the possibility of surveillance and 
prohibiting the use of employer-provided technology for personal 
communications.29  In spite of these warnings, the court found the 
expectation was reasonable because the employer had an informal 
practice of assuring Quon that he could maintain privacy in the messages 
if he personally paid all monthly overage fees on the pager.30  
Having located a privacy right based on Quon’s reasonable 
expectations, the court also held that the employer’s review of the 
content of these messages was unreasonable in scope based on its failure 
to use less intrusive means in investigating whether the messages were 
work-related in nature.31  The Quon court’s treatment of this issue 
represents a split from several circuits and, as this Comment will 
conclude, a departure from Supreme Court precedent.   
In January 2009, the employer petitioned the Ninth Circuit to rehear 
Quon en banc, which was denied by a majority of the Ninth Circuit 
judges.  The denial of the rehearing, though, inspired an impassioned 
dissent, joined by seven judges and authored by Judge Ikuta, who 
                                                                                                             
 26 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 27 Id. Quon not only sued his employer under federal and state constitutions but also 
filed suit against Arch Wireless, the third-party service provider that released the content 
of the text messages to the city, claiming Arch violated the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”), codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2701 and part of the EPPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2701-2711. 
While this Comment focuses on the interplay between employer and employee interests 
regarding workplace technology, and therefore does not confront the Ninth Circuit’s 
controversial SCA interpretation, it is worth noting how the SCA presents an equally 
important potential source of protection for private- and public-sector employees.  The 
SCA expands the scope of liability to those outside the direct employment relationship 
and, as constitutional protections are often unavailable for private-sector employees, a 
statute such as the SCA becomes a critically important form of protection, despite its 
inherent limitations. See generally Kerr, supra note 20. It is also worth nothing that the 
Ninth Circuit has already been openly criticized for its reading and application of the 
SCA by a Michigan district court. See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. 
Mich. 2008). 
 28 Quon, 529 F.3d at 908. 
 29 Id. at 907. 
 30 Id. at 908. 
 31 Id. at 909. 
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directly criticized the panel’s use of the “less intrusive means” standard 
that created the circuit split.32 
In some regards, Quon represents valuable insight into the current 
state of workplace privacy jurisprudence and could signal the potential 
expansion of employee privacy. Its application also may be more 
expansive than it first appears, beyond its impact on public-sector 
employees in the Ninth Circuit.  In addition to his Fourth Amendment 
claim, Quon filed suit that his employer violated his privacy under the 
California Constitution.33 Because the court held that its application of 
Ortega governed its decision of Quon’s federal and state constitutional 
claims, and because the California Constitution applies to private-sector 
employees, the panel’s expansive inquiry into the reasonableness of the 
public-sector employer’s search could have an impact on the privacy 
rights of private-sector employees in California, who, as of 2005, 
comprise 11.6% of the nation’s total private-sector employment.34  
Part II of this Comment sets forth the dramatic facts leading up to 
the Quon case, which stand as a prime example of the tension at play in 
the modern workplace between employer and employee interests 
regarding employer-provided communication devices. Part III discusses 
the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Ortega for investigating 
claims of workplace privacy intrusion and continues with an exploration 
of how the two prongs of the Ortega test have generally been applied in 
the circuits.  Part IV closely examines how the Ninth Circuit applied the 
Ortega test in Quon, as well as the potential ramifications of the panel’s 
disregard of Supreme Court precedent and the court’s split from several 
sister circuits in its analysis under the second Ortega prong. Finally, this 
comment concludes, in Part V, with a consideration of alternative means 
to address the privacy concerns inherent in the modern workplace and a 
proposal for potential legislative action to combat dwindling workplace 
privacy. 
II. TENSIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE INTERESTS ON 
DISPLAY IN QUON 
Before the Ninth Circuit could investigate the legal parameters of 
Quon’s Fourth Amendment and state constitution claims, the trial court 
                                                                                                             
 32 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial to rehear en banc). 
 33 CA. CONST. art. I, § 1. (“All people are by nature free and independent and have 
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending . . . privacy.”). 
 34 Batelle Tech. P’ship Practice & SSTI, Laboratories of Innovation: State Bioscience 
Initiatives 2004, at 5, available at http://www.bio.org/local/battelle 2004/battelle2004.pdf 
(last updated July 15, 2005). 
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had to confront the sordid workplace that gave rise to the dispute.35  Like 
many other workplaces, the Ontario Police Department (“OPD”) had its 
fair share of melodrama. While all the facts in the background of Quon’s 
workplace do not bear on the crucial doctrinal aspects of the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision, the gritty realities of the OPD demonstrates the 
tensions at play between employer and employee interests in workplace 
technology.36   
Prior to the audit of Quon’s text messages at issue in the litigation, 
the OPD had to address a legitimate concern: its employees had used 
city-provided pagers to undermine a narcotics investigation.37 In 
September 2002, one of the city’s dispatchers, Sally Bors, realized her 
boyfriend, a member of the Hells Angels motorcycle gang, was under 
investigation by the police department.38  Bors decided to warn her 
boyfriend, Mark Timbrell, that he was being followed, but she did not 
want to do the dirty work herself.39  Accordingly, she paged her friend 
and fellow dispatcher Angela Santos, telling her to warn him.40  Santos 
used her employer-provided pager to warn Timbrell and then quickly 
confessed her malfeasance to yet another dispatcher, April Florio.41  
Gossip apparently traveled like wildfire in the OPD, and Florio told 
Doreen Klein, another dispatcher, about the wrongdoing.42  None of the 
aforesaid participants in the incident told their supervisors about what 
occurred.43  The next day, somehow aware of what had transpired, 
internal affairs Sergeant Deborah Glenn spoke with Florio and Klein, 
first asking them to hand over their pagers so as to prevent them from 
corroborating their stories.44  Both Florio and Klein feigned ignorance 
but Santos, when interviewed, confessed about the tip-off.45 
When the dispatchers compromised the Hells Angels investigation 
by tipping off Bors’ boyfriend, they acted in a manner that jeopardized 
the city’s interests in covertly and efficiently battling crime.46  The 
dispatchers’ tip-off to the Hells Angels exemplifies employee misuse of 
workplace technology and demonstrates the motivations behind 
employer decisions to monitor employee actions, especially when public 
                                                                                                             
 35 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 36 Id. at 1149. 
 37 Id. at 1121. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1149. 
 41 Id. at 1122. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1122. 
 46 Id. at 1121. 
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safety may be negatively affected as a result of public-sector employees’ 
misconduct.47 
Around the same time, Jeff Quon was about to confront his own 
investigation.48  Quon, like Florio, Bors and Santos, used a city-provided 
pager.49  In October 2001, the OPD purchased pagers for its SWAT team 
members in order to facilitate their coordination with one another and 
increase their response time in emergency situations.50  The city 
contracted with Arch Wireless for a usage plan in which the city paid a 
flat subscription rate for 25,000 characters per month per pager, with the 
city paying any overage fees incurred by the officers on a per-character 
basis.51  Upon receiving the pagers, the SWAT team members, including 
Quon, were told orally that the pagers were subject to monitoring 
pursuant to the city’s general anti-privacy policy.52  When hiring, the 
OPD requires that all employees read and sign its formal general 
Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy, which informs them that all 
network activity, including e-mail and Internet use, may be monitored, 
with or without notice, and that the city considered as its property all 
hard copy or electronic employee communications.53  Furthermore, the 
city policy prohibited employee use of city property, including pagers 
and cell phones, for personal or confidential communication.54  Under 
this policy, the city contended at trial that it considered pager messages 
sent by police officers as “e-mail,” therefore subjecting any messages 
sent on city-provided alphanumeric pagers to potential auditing.55 
Over the next few months, Police Chief Lloyd Scharf was 
concerned that “someone was wasting a lot of City time conversing with 
someone about non-related work issues” on the pagers, and asked 
Lieutenant Steven Duke (“Duke”), who managed the city’s electronic 
equipment, to identify those responsible for the monthly character 
overages.56 Upon realizing that officers were repeatedly sending pager 
messages in excess of the monthly limit, the OPD warned Quon, who 
was the main offender of exceeding the monthly character limit, not to 
exceed his monthly limit.57  At the same time, Duke assured Quon that 
                                                                                                             
 47 Id. at 1124. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1123. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 1123. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Quon, 529 F.3d. at 897. 
 56 Id. at 1126. 
 57 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1124. 
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the city would not conduct an audit of his messages as long as he paid for 
the overage amount whenever he exceeded it.58  While allowing Quon to 
pay for his overages, Duke claims he also reiterated several times that 
messages sent from and received on the pagers were subject to the city’s 
usage policy and could be audited.59  In April 2002, Quon received a 
memorandum from Scharf stating: “Reminder that two-way pagers are 
considered e-mail messages.  This means that messages would fall under 
the City’s policy as public information and eligible for auditing.”60  By 
August 2002, Quon continued to exceed his monthly allotment, and 
Duke had “grown tired of being a bill collector,” so the department 
ordered an audit of Quon’s messages to determine the necessity of a 
character-per-month increase.61 
In order to carry out Scharf’s orders for an investigation, Duke 
requested transcripts of the text messages from Arch Wireless, who held 
the messages in storage, in order to determine whether the messages 
were work-related in nature.62  Duke and Scharf read the content of 
Quon’s messages sent from August 1, 2002 to September 31, 2002.63  
Upon examination, the city determined that, in a month’s total of 450 
text messages, Quon had sent 57 work-related messages, while the rest 
were of a personal, and often sexually explicit, nature.64  The sexually 
explicit text messages confirmed the water cooler gossip about Quon—
while some of the racy messages were sent to his wife, Jerilynn, a fellow 
Ontario police officer, others were sent to his mistress and co-worker, 
Florio.65   
As Sergeant Glenn conducted her investigation into the Hells 
Angels incident, she also wanted a peek at Quon’s text messages to 
gauge just how inappropriate employees of the OPD were behaving, 
although no evidence at trial suggested that she actually read the 
messages.66  After Duke and Scharf read the messages, the city 
demanded that Quon explain the sexually inappropriate messages, 
warned him about potential disciplinary action, and denied him a special 
assignment with the OPD.67  Quon subsequently filed suit, alleging that 
the city violated Quon’s privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment and 
                                                                                                             
 58 Id. at 1124. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Quon, 529 F.3d. at 897. 
 61 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1125. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1126. 
 65 Id. at 1122. 
 66 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1127. 
 67 Id. at 1126. 
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California Constitution by viewing the text message content.68 The other 
players in this melodrama—his wife, Florio, Klein and another officer—
likewise filed suit, alleging their privacy rights had been violated due to 
the OPD reading their messages to Quon, although their suits were 
dismissed. 69 
While the trial court ultimately dismissed Florio’s and Klein’s 
claims, and the facts of their malfeasance do not bear on the doctrinal 
aspects of the Quon decision,70 these facts demonstrate the tensions at 
play regarding workplace technology.71  Like any savvy employer, the 
OPD upgraded its technology and provided pagers to its SWAT team 
members and dispatchers.72  The city also knew enough to implement a 
formal technology anti-privacy policy, putting all employees on notice of 
possible surveillance.73 Both of these administrative decisions exemplify 
employer interests in enhancing efficiency through communication-
oriented technology and maintaining some control over the technology 
they provide to employees.74 The OPD had an interest in managing the 
pager-use of an employee like Quon, whose consistent utilization of 
employer-provided technology for personal communications revealed his 
misuse of company time, for which he was earning a salary.75  While the 
city may not have confronted the issue in a manner consistent with its 
own best interests, its decision to find out whether an employee used 
company time for his own personal communications reflects the 
concerns any employer has regarding employees wasting company time 
and resources.76 
Conversely, the factual background of the Quon case reflects the 
realities that employees will follow managerial directives and, if given 
the impression that they will enjoy some sphere of privacy, they will 
continue to use workplace technology for private, sensitive 
communications.  As demonstrated by the facts of the case, employees 
cheat on their spouses, have workplace affairs, and allow their personal 
problems to bleed into their professional lives—all the while potentially 
divulging this sensitive information to their employers by 
communicating about it on workplace computers, laptops and 
BlackBerries.   
                                                                                                             
 68 Quon, 529 F.3d. at 898. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1149. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 1123. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 1125. 
 75 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1124. 
 76 Id. at 1124. 
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Perhaps Quon should have known, on his own, not to send sexually 
explicit messages on his employer-provided pager, especially when the 
recipient was a fellow OPD employee who was not his co-worker/wife, 
but the realities of his workplace conveyed a mixed message.  While the 
OPD had a general anti-privacy policy warning about surveillance, it also 
allowed another employee with supervisory power to lead Quon to 
believe he could avoid invasion into his text messages by paying his 
monthly overages. Many employees in Quon’s position would likely 
have felt that his direct supervisor’s actions trumped an anti-privacy 
policy, which he had probably skimmed, signed two years earlier and 
completely forgotten.  Duke may have been trying to be a “nice guy” by 
allowing Quon to pay for his overages, but this informal practice stood 
contrary to all the OPD’s formal written anti-privacy policies, and 
justified Quon’s belief that he enjoyed some privacy in his text messages.  
These facts behind the OPD’s policies and practices send a clear warning 
not only to employees, who should be aware of when their workplace 
communications will be monitored, but also employers, who may have 
supervisors sending contradictory and misleading messages about what 
when technology will be monitored and when communications will be 
kept private. 
Although the Quon panel focused only on the facts regarding the 
OPD’s anti-privacy policy and Quon’s use of the pager, the general 
issues at the OPD embody the tension at play in the contemporary 
workplace.  Both employers and employees have equally important 
stakes in the allocation of privacy rights regarding workplace privacy. 
 
III. THE ORTEGA FRAMEWORK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
CIRCUITS BALANCE EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE INTERESTS 
After the OPD read his text messages, Quon filed suit alleging that 
the city violated Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights, which protect 
individuals from unwarranted searches and seizures by the government.77 
In analyzing his Fourth Amendment claim, the Ninth Circuit applied the 
framework set forth by the Supreme Court in O’Connor v. Ortega.78  
With this seminal workplace privacy case, the Supreme Court confirmed 
that the Fourth Amendment protects one’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the workplace.79 In Ortega, the Supreme Court announced that 
public-sector employees may enjoy some privacy in the physical 
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workplace, such as desks and file cabinets, based on whether the context 
of a particular workplace fosters within the employee a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.80 The employer in Ortega, a state hospital, 
searched the office of one of its doctors as part of a sexual harassment 
investigation that eventually resulted in the employee’s termination.81 
After his termination, Ortega claimed the search of his office violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights.82 The plurality held that he enjoyed a 
reasonable privacy expectation in his physical workplace, and the 
government’s search was unreasonable in its inception and scope.83 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, set forth a contextual 
approach to examining whether employees have reasonable privacy 
expectations and employers conducted reasonable workplace searches.84  
To guide lower courts in investigating Fourth Amendment workplace 
privacy claims, the plurality applied a two-part inquiry.85  First, in order 
to invoke Fourth Amendment workplace privacy protection, the 
employee must have enjoyed a reasonable privacy expectation in the area 
or thing intruded upon at work.86  If the context of the employee’s 
workplace fostered a reasonable privacy expectation, then some Fourth 
Amendment protection applies, requiring the employer to, at a minimum, 
provide some reasonable or legitimate reason for its intrusion into the 
employee’s privacy.87 
A. The First Ortega Test: Reasonable Employee Privacy Expectations  
Under the first Ortega inquiry, the Court focused its analysis on the 
particular context of a workplace in order to gauge the reasonableness of 
an employee’s expectation of privacy.88 According to the Court, this 
workplace includes “those areas and items that are related to work and 
are generally within the employer’s control” and these “areas remain part 
of the workplace context even if the employee has placed personal items 
in them, such as a photograph placed in a desk or a letter posted on an 
employee bulletin board.”89  Mere access to an employee’s items within 
the workplace—for example, personal items located in an employee’s 
handbag, closed luggage or a briefcase—will not extinguish a reasonable 
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 88 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 715. 
 89 Id. at 715–16. 
474 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:461 
privacy expectation.90 An employee’s reasonable privacy expectation and 
subsequent Fourth Amendment protection hinge on the particular 
workplace structures and practices affecting the workplace in question.91 
Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence in which he suggested an 
alternative test for Fourth Amendment application in the employment 
context.92  Although he agreed that Ortega enjoyed a reasonable privacy 
expectation in his office, he expressed dissatisfaction with the plurality’s 
contextual methodology and the Court’s open invitation for employers to 
regulate privacy out of existence by manipulating the context of the 
workplace.93 Accordingly, he feared that “[n]o clue is provided as to how 
open ‘so open’ must be” and that the plurality’s standard is “so devoid of 
content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field.”94 
Justice Scalia instead proposed a categorical approach to workplace 
privacy invasions, insisting that his approach would more closely align 
with existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: 
Whatever the plurality’s standard means . . . it must 
be wrong if it leads to the conclusion on the present 
facts that if Hospital officials had extensive work-
related reasons to enter Dr. Ortega’s office no Fourth 
Amendment protection existed. It is privacy that is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, not solitude. A 
man enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in his 
home, for example, even though his wife and children 
have the run of the place—and indeed, even though 
his landlord has the right to conduct unannounced 
inspections at any time. Similarly, in my view, one’s 
personal office is constitutionally protected against 
warrantless intrusions by the police, even though 
employer and co-workers are not excluded.95 
Rather than determine whether workplace privacy exists on an ad hoc, 
case-by-case basis, as the plurality’s test requires, Scalia would have 
created a categorical approach, in which “offices of government 
employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those offices, are 
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.”96  Under 
his formulation, government employees would presumptively enjoy 
privacy protection in physical workspaces, and the inquiry as to whether 
                                                                                                             
 90 Id. at 717. 
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 92 Id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 93 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 94 Id. at 729–30 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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a privacy violation occurred would then turn on whether the government-
employer’s search was reasonable.97  This categorical approach would 
have ensured a more predictable or consistent privacy protection for 
government employees than that afforded by the plurality’s approach, 
which demonstrates a greater deference to employer interests in 
monitoring the workplace.98   
Scalia’s concerns seem prophetic considering how this portion of 
the Ortega test has been applied by the circuits, which routinely find that 
employer anti-privacy policies and other structural workplace 
manipulations by employers diminish employee expectations of 
privacy.99  Regardless of Scalia’s concerns and the incentives for 
employers created by the plurality’s contextual methodology, a public-
sector employee who alleges that his employer violated his privacy must 
demonstrate that his expectation of privacy is “reasonable under all the 
circumstances” of his particular workplace.100 
B. The First Ortega Inquiry in the Circuits: Employer Privacy Policies 
Diminish Employee Privacy Expectations  
In the wake of Ortega, the circuits have applied the first Ortega 
prong by examining predictable factors in a given workplace, including 
an employee’s “exclusive use” of a workspace, the degree to which the 
public has access to the workspace, and whether the employer 
disseminated an anti-privacy policy to place employees on notice for 
monitoring.101  As a result of this contextual method, employers can alter 
the structure of the workplace by manipulating physical space and 
furniture and through general office practices that make spaces more 
open to the “public,” in order to reduce or eliminate one’s privacy 
expectation.  Employers often achieve this result with regard to physical 
spaces and employee communications much more efficiently by simply 
using anti-privacy policies so as to render privacy expectations 
unreasonable.102  For example, the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that 
when employers reserve the right to monitor workplace technology in a 
general policy, employees cannot have a reasonable expectation to 
                                                                                                             
 97 Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 98 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 730. 
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 101 See Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 871 F.2d 566 (6th 
Cir. 1989); Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987); 
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privacy in communications sent on workplace computers and cell 
phones.103  
Other circuit decisions demonstrate that anti-privacy policies can be 
dispositive as to whether an employee has a reasonable expectation to 
privacy.  The Sixth Circuit, in American Postal Workers Union v. United 
States Postal Service, found that a postal worker had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy “in light of the clearly expressed provisions 
permitting random and unannounced locker inspections.”104  The court 
found that the employee’s privacy expectation was unreasonable even 
though the employer had never actually conducted any unannounced 
locker inspection and therefore did not practice its policy.105  Moreover, 
in United States v. Angevine, the Tenth Circuit found that an employee 
did not have a reasonable privacy expectation in his workplace computer 
when a “splash screen” warning discouraging employees from sending 
personal communications appeared every time he logged in to his 
computer.106  In so holding, the court reasoned that the employer’s 
“computer-use policy reserved the right to randomly audit Internet use 
and to monitor specific individuals suspected of misusing . . . 
computers,” and the policy thereby placed the employee on notice as to 
monitoring, making his expectation of privacy unreasonable.107  The 
Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have taken a similar approach in 
finding that anti-privacy policies defeat employee privacy 
expectations.108 
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Conversely, the circuits have found that the absence of a general 
anti-privacy policy may foster a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
workplace.  In McGregor v. Greer, the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia denied the employer-defendant’s summary 
judgment motion because the workplace anti-privacy policy was unclear 
and the employee may have therefore had a reasonable privacy 
expectation.109 The Second Circuit likewise found, in Leventhal v. 
Knapek, that an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of his office computer when the employer neither practiced 
routine searches on office computers nor disseminated a general anti-
privacy policy.110 
As demonstrated by these decisions, because an employee’s privacy 
expectation must be reasonable before he has any Fourth Amendment 
protection, and because the Ortega framework works on a contextual 
rather than a categorical approach, private ordering has defined 
workplace privacy.111  Therefore, employers may alter the context of a 
given workplace to eliminate employee privacy expectations so that they 
can conduct as much surveillance as desired. 
C: The Second Ortega Test: Reasonable Employer Searches 
 
Under the Ortega test, once an employee has established a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a physical or Internet space, the 
inquiry turns to the second step, which is whether the employer’s 
intrusion was justified. In creating this inquiry into the reasonableness of 
the employer’s search, the Court carved out an exception for 
government-employers conducting workplace searches, allowing 
employers to circumvent historical Fourth Amendment requirements for 
probable cause and a search warrant.112  The Court created an exception 
to these requirements mindful of employer interests in monitoring the 
workplace and the less-substantial privacy interests of government 
employees compared to the privacy interests of individuals in their 
homes.113 The Court stated that a public-sector employer would not have 
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to show the need for probable cause or obtain a warrant because “[t]he 
delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for 
probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into 
tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency's work, and 
ultimately to the public interest.”114    
Furthermore, the Court found that placing these normal Fourth 
Amendment burdens on public-sector employers would be unworkable in 
practice.115  In so holding, the plurality relied on Justice Blackmun’s 
concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O., in which he stated that a public 
school teacher’s search of a student’s purse for cigarettes was reasonable 
because a “special needs” exception exists for teachers to respond to 
potential emergency situations.116 Under such a “special needs” 
exception, a government employer is justified in not comporting with 
Fourth Amendment probable cause and search warrant requirements.117 
The Ortega plurality analogized public-sector employers to teachers, 
who have “neither the training nor the day-to-day experience in the 
complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement officer possesses, 
and [are] ill-equipped to make a quick judgment about the existence of 
probable cause.”118   
Similarly, the Court stated that “employers most frequently need to 
enter the offices and desks of their employees for legitimate work-related 
reasons wholly unrelated to illegal conduct” and that “requiring an 
employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an 
employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose 
would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be 
unduly burdensome.”119 Although Blackmun dissented from the 
plurality’s application of the “special needs” exception in the public-
sector context,120 the plurality held that workplace searches would count 
as a “special needs” exception for normal Fourth Amendment probable 
cause and search warrant requirements.121 
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Therefore, because workplace searches conducted by public-sector 
employers would fall under the “special needs” doctrine, the standard for 
determining whether an employer’s search is justified is one of 
“reasonableness.”122 The Court acknowledged the interests of public-
sector employers “in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective 
and efficient manner.”123 The Court further stated that “the work of these 
agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, 
mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees.”124  
In providing this exception, the Court did not seem greatly concerned 
with employee privacy beyond whether the context of a given workplace 
makes the employee’s expectation of privacy reasonable, stating that the 
burden to avoid privacy violations should be on employees, who “may 
avoid exposing personal belongings at work by simply leaving them at 
home.”125 
Then, to avoid a finding that its search violated this expectation of 
privacy, the government-employer must justify its intrusion as 
reasonable.126 The reasonableness of an employer’s search has two 
components.127  First, the search must be reasonable at its inception, with 
the employer having some “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the 
search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related 
misconduct.”128  Second, the search must be reasonable in scope, which 
requires the employer to adopt measures that are “reasonably related to 
the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of . . . 
the nature of the [misconduct].”129 Again, this inquiry provides deference 
to employers in choosing the methods they employ in conducting 
workplace searches.   
While the Ortega plurality merely instructed courts, in reviewing 
whether an employer’s search was reasonable, to find whether a 
reasonable nexus existed between the objectives of the search and the 
actual search conducted, the Supreme Court later explicitly rejected 
examining whether an employer could have used less intrusive means to 
achieve its legitimate purposes.  In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ 
Association, the Court analyzed a public-sector employee’s claim that his 
employer’s use of drug testing violated his Fourth Amendment privacy 
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rights.130  In holding that the employer had a legitimate interest in 
maintaining safety and efficiency and that its use of drug testing to 
ensure these interests was reasonable in its inception and scope, the 
Court rejected the employee’s contention that the search was 
unreasonable because the government-employer could have used less 
invasive means to uncover whether employees used drugs.131  
The Skinner Court affirmatively stated that, under an analysis of the 
second Ortega prong, it would not demand lower courts to inquire 
whether there were less intrusive means available when an employer 
conducts a workplace search.132  The Court reasoned that using this 
standard to determine the nexus between the employer’s interest in 
conducting a search and the reasonableness of the search would 
undermine the Ortega plurality’s concern for respecting legitimate 
employer interests: 
We have repeatedly stated . . . that ‘[t]he 
reasonableness of any particular government activity 
does not necessarily or invariably turn on the 
existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means. It is 
obvious that ‘[t]he logic of such elaborate less-
restrictive-alternative arguments could raise 
insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all 
search-and-seizure powers,’ because judges engaged 
in post hoc evaluations of government conduct ‘can 
almost always imagine some alternative means by 
which the objectives of the [government] might have 
been accomplished.’”133 
Thus, the Supreme Court has clearly decided against a requirement that 
employers exhaust less-invasive workplace monitoring.134  
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D. The Second Ortega Prong in the Circuits: Rejection of the “Least 
Intrusive Means” Test 
Similar to the first prong, the circuits have followed the Supreme 
Court’s framework for analyzing whether an employer’s search is 
reasonable in its inception and scope. For example, the Second Circuit, in 
Leventhal v. Knapek,135 applied the second prong of Ortega to hold that, 
based on the fact that the employer reasonably suspected the employee 
was neglecting his duties, its searches of his computer were reasonable in 
light of the state’s need to investigate the allegations of the employee’s 
misconduct.136  In so holding, the Second Circuit set forth the model 
analysis under this prong: a court will identify the employer’s interest at 
stake in the search and then determine whether the actual search 
conducted is reasonable in comparison.137  If the search proves to be 
excessive, it is unreasonable and the employee will succeed on his Fourth 
Amendment claim.138 
After the Supreme Court announced its unwillingness to analyze an 
employer’s searched based on an analysis of less-intrusive means when 
an employer conducted a workplace search, seven circuits likewise 
rejected the “least intrusive means” test.139  However, in a case that 
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predates Skinner, the Ninth Circuit applied this rejected standard in its 
analysis of the second Ortega prong in Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics 
Corp.140  In Schowengerdt, the court held that if the employer could have 
used less intrusive means to conduct the search to further its legitimate 
interest, the search would be unreasonable.141  In that case, an 
employee’s locked desk was searched for sexual materials, and he filed 
suit alleging that the search violated his privacy expectation.142 In 
remanding to the lower court to find whether the employer’s search was 
reasonable at its inception and in scope, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]f 
less intrusive methods were feasible, or if the depth of the inquiry or 
extent of the seizure exceeded that necessary for the government’s 
legitimate purposes, such as its interest in security, the search would be 
unreasonable and Schowengerdt’s Fourth Amendment rights and right to 
privacy would have been violated.”143  
The Skinner Court explicitly rejected this inquiry into less-intrusive 
searches as too onerous a burden on employers conducting workplace 
searches.144 The Quon panel directly justified its result in finding the 
OPD’s search to be unreasonable on this “less intrusive means” language 
in the Schowengerdt decision.145  As discussed in the next section, this 
Comment posits that by citing a pre-Skinner decision that is no longer 
good law as part of its analysis under the second Ortega prong, the Quon 
panel not only departed from Supreme Court precedent and split from 
seven sister circuits but also upset the balance struck by the Ortega 
plurality between the conflicting privacy interests of employers and 
employees. 
 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF THE ORTEGA FRAMEWORK IN 
QUON 
Quon succeeded in arguing that the city violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights by reading his text messages and defying his 
reasonable expectation of privacy.146 In so holding, the Quon panel 
correctly applied the first Ortega prong to find he had a reasonable 
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expectation of privacy.147  However, the panel mistakenly used language 
from the Schowengerdt decision and found the OPD’s search to be 
unreasonable based on an analysis of less intrusive means the city could 
have used when conducting the search of Quon’s text messages.148   
Under its analysis of the first Ortega prong, the panel correctly 
applied the contextual Ortega methodology and based its conclusion that 
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy on the fact that the OPD 
had an informal practice of allowing Quon to pay his overages, despite 
the formal anti-privacy policy.149  The court found that Quon’s 
expectation of privacy was reasonable due to his employer’s conflict 
between a general anti-privacy policy and an informal practice of 
allowing Quon to maintain his privacy in his text messages.   
Therefore, regarding the panel’s analysis of the first Ortega prong, 
the Quon court’s conclusion is important because it instructs employers 
on how to structure and enforce workplace anti-privacy policies. This 
portion of the holding stands as a lesson for employers who want to 
maximize workplace surveillance by not only creating an anti-privacy 
policy but strictly enforcing it in order to render unreasonable any 
workplace expectation of privacy. 
Regarding the analysis under the second prong, the panel applied 
the rejected “less intrusive means” standard and shifted the balance 
struck by the Ortega plurality.150 In finding that the OPD’s search was 
unreasonable, the court adduced that it could have used several less 
intrusive hypothetical means to achieve its goal of monitoring the 
pagers.151  As part of its analysis, the panel quoted from its decision in 
Schowengerdt, despite the fact that Skinner Court superceded the 
Schowengerdt decision when it rejected the “least intrusive means” 
test.152  
In the wake of this controversial finding, the OPD petitioned for the 
Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc.153 This effort split the Ninth 
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Circuit: the original three-judge panel and a majority of active Ninth 
Circuit judges voted to deny the petition to rehear the case, with Judge 
Wardlaw writing a concurrence defending the denial, while seven judges 
dissented from the denial of a rehearing, led by Judge Ikuta’s 
impassioned dissent.154 In his dissent, Ikuta correctly maintained that the 
panel’s analysis of whether the OPD could have used less intrusive 
means to investigate employee pager use and protect its interest in 
workplace efficiency runs contrary to the Ortega plurality’s concerns 
with placing too great a burden on employers.155   
In her concurrence to the rehearing denial, Judge Wardlaw insisted 
that the panel did not employ the rejected test and instead merely ensured 
the reasonableness of the nexus between the interest and the search.156  
As part of this rationale, Wardlaw tried to justify the panel’s analysis of 
the less-intrusive means the OPD could have used by distinguishing the 
cases in which the Supreme Court rejected the “least intrusive means” 
test.157 However, the test was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court 
and seven sister circuits, and Wardlaw and the panel ultimately ignored 
the Ortega plurality’s edict that all workplace searches by public-sector 
employers fall under the “special needs” exception, and the employer, 
upon conducting a search, must only demonstrate some justification for 
conducting the search.158  As a result of the use of this test, the Ninth 
Circuit split from sister circuits and potentially upset the Ortega balance 
between employer and employee interests.159 
                                                                                                             
impracticable. Due to its unruly size, the Ninth Circuit availed itself of Congress’s 
modified en banc procedure, allowing any circuit with more than 15 authorized 
judgeships to designate its own rule for how many judges will hear a case en banc. See 28 
U.S.C. § 46(c) and Pub. L. No 95-486, § 6.  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit requires that 
the chief judge, along with at least 10 of the 28 judges, sit for a petition to rehear en banc, 
and that this 11-judge panel will rehear the case if they unanimously agree. USCS Ct App 
9th Cir., Circuit R 35–3. Regarding the OPD’s petition, because Judges Pregerson, 
Wardlaw, and Leighton, comprising the original three-judge Quon panel, voted to deny 
the petition to rehear the case en banc. Furthermore, when the full court was advised of 
the petition for rehearing en banc, a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges 
in favor of en banc reconsideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35. For an in-depth exploration of 
how the Ninth Circuit’s size, and the resulting inefficiencies, harms “nearly 20 percent of 
the nation’s population,” see Examining the Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit: 
Hearing on S. 1845 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) 
(statement of Rachel L. Brand, Asst. Att’y Gen. for the Office of Legal Policy),  
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/ninth_circuit_split_aag_brand_testimony.pdf.  
 154 Quon, 554 F.3d at 769. 
 155 Id. (Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 156 Id. (Wardlaw, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 157 See infra Part IV.B. 
 158 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 724. See also supra Part III.C. and D. 
 159 Quon, 529 F.3d at 777–78 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc). See also supra Part III.D. 
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A. Quon’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Conflict Between an 
Informal Practice and a Formal Anti-Privacy Policy 
Despite the city’s formal anti-privacy policy warning employees 
about the possibility of surveillance, the Ninth Circuit applied the Ortega 
contextual methodology to find that Quon had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy based on Duke’s informal practice of allowing Quon to pay 
for personal character overages to avoid an audit.160  Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that the OPD had created a reasonable privacy 
expectation because it had a contrary informal practice of allowing the 
officers to pay for overages to avoid audits.161  
In the denial to rehear Quon en banc, Judges Wardlaw and Ikuta 
agreed on the standard under the first Ortega prong but haggled over the 
factual realities of the OPD and whether the informal practice actually 
created a reasonable privacy expectation for Quon.162  Ikuta argued that 
the mixed messages sent by the OPD should be trumped by the formal 
written policy, while Wardlaw maintained that the informal practice 
negated the written anti-privacy policy and gave Quon a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the content of his text messages.163  Essentially, 
Wardlaw correctly stated that Quon’s expectation was reasonable 
because any employee who would have been told that he could avoid an 
audit of his messages if he paid the overages himself would expect his 
messages to remain private if he kept paying.  Therefore, this portion of 
the panel’s decision is correct based on the operational realities of 
Quon’s workplace. 
This holding is important because it sends a message to employers 
that they could potentially be held liable for workplace privacy invasions 
if they allow an informal practice to foster a reasonable expectation of 
privacy within employees.  Therefore, Quon instructs employers on how 
they can structure workplace practices and conduct surveillance without 
making the OPD’s same mistake of creating and then violating employee 
expectations of privacy. In order to discourage employee expectations of 
privacy, employers now know that they must not only disseminate a 
general anti-privacy policy but also that they must take measures to 
strictly practice that policy to avoid the creation of reasonable privacy 
expectations.164   
                                                                                                             
 160 Quon, 529 F.3d at 897. 
 161 Id.  
 162 Quon, 554 F.3d at 770, 774.  
 163 Id. at 770, 774. 
 164 See Mark E. Schreiber and Barbara A. Lee, Practice Tips: New Liabilities and 
Policies for Incidental Private Use of Company Electronic Systems and PDAs, 52 
BOSTON BAR JOURNAL 11 (2008). (“[Quon] . . . provides a sobering example of why 
486 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:461 
At its most extreme, the court’s holding under the first Ortega 
prong provides a perverse incentive for employers to routinely intrude 
into employee privacy, to ensure that no informal practices on 
surveillance reverse the presumption that employees do not enjoy a 
privacy expectation under general privacy policies. If an Information 
Technology specialist or general manager gives employees the 
impression that the company will not actually conduct surveillance, then 
the employee may be found to have enjoyed a reasonable expectation of 
privacy that then limits how the employer may conduct a workplace 
search.165 
At the same time, the holding is important for employees because 
of the potential downstream effects it could have on how employers 
structure workplaces.  At first glance, the panel’s result—finding that an 
employee enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy on his employer-
provided pager, used under a general anti-privacy policy—seems to 
provide some increased privacy protection for employees.  Although the 
court found that Quon had a reasonable privacy expectation, and this 
seems like a victory for employees who want greater workplace privacy 
protection, this decision may result in enhanced protection only in a 
narrow set of cases in which an employer failed to enforce its formal 
policy.  Indeed, the Quon decision itself is a warning signal that this 
decision provides for subsequent employers, who now know that they 
must practice what they preach in terms of privacy and surveillance.166  
Practically speaking, if employers really do pick up on the cues of 
the Quon decision and regularly enforce their surveillance policies, the 
context of a given workplace will place employees on notice that their 
employers are looking over their shoulders when they communicate on 
workplace computers, laptops, and cell phones.  In this regard, the 
decision could result in fewer mixed messages like the ones the OPD 
                                                                                                             
companies should be alert to this problem so they can adjust their strategies 
accordingly.”). 
 165 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 730. 
 166 See Schreiber, supra note 164 (describing Quon and setting forth explicit lessons 
employers should learn from the case, including drafting “policies regarding employee 
use of email, internet access, and PDAs” that are “clear that employees have no 
expectation of privacy and can expect their use of these systems and devices, including 
personal use and messages, to be subject to monitoring and access by the employer with 
or without notice.”); CALIFORNIA EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS AND 
PERSONNEL POLICY MANUALS, 1-2 CA Guide to Employee Handbooks § 2.16 (“The 
Quon decision serves as a reminder that employers must avoid statements and actions 
that might be construed as giving employees a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
electronic messages or other data created or transmitted using Company equipment. In 
this regard, it is important that all managers in an organization stay ‘on message’ where 
surveillance of employee communications is concerned.”). 
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sent to its employees and will instead encourage full disclosure when 
surveillance occurs.  Ironically then, the contextual methodology 
espoused by the Ortega plurality and underlying the Quon decision 
ultimately creates an equilibrium in which employers have an incentive 
to maximize surveillance to reduce employee expectations of privacy.  
Accordingly, employees can trust they are being watched at all times and 
are less likely to share personal correspondence on employer-provided 
technology.  
B. The Quon Court’s Use of the “Least Intrusive Means” Test 
Pro-employee advocates in search of expanded workplace privacy 
rights should instead look to the Quon panel’s analysis under the second 
Ortega prong, in which the panel inquired into less-intrusive means the 
OPD could have used to conduct its search.  Upon finding Quon had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, the panel 
investigated the reasonableness of the OPD’s search of his messages and 
held that the search was unreasonable in its scope.167 As any court must 
first determine when examining the reasonableness of a workplace 
search, the Ninth Circuit panel identified what objective the OPD 
actually had in conducting the search.168  The panel reiterated that, at the 
trial level, the jury determined that the purpose of the search was to 
determine the “efficacy of the existing character limits to ensure that 
officers were not paying hidden work-related costs.”169  The trial court 
instructed the jury that if it found this to be the purpose of the search then 
they must find that the search was reasonable as a matter of law, and the 
OPD was not found liable as a result.  However, on appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit panel determined that the “search was nevertheless 
unconstitutional” because it found that the search, for Scharf’s intended 
purpose, “was not reasonable in scope.”170 
As part of its determination that the search conducted was 
unreasonable in scope, the panel quoted Schowengerdt, stating that “if 
less intrusive methods [to investigate Quon’s overages] were feasible, or 
if the depth of the inquiry or extent of the seizure exceeded that 
necessary for the government’s legitimate purposes . . . the search would 
be unreasonable . . . .”171 Then, the Ninth Circuit inquired into the 
reasonableness of the city’s investigation based not on the actual search 
                                                                                                             
 167 Quon, 529 F.3d at 908. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1146. 
 170 Quon, 529 F.3d at 908. 
 171 Id. (quoting Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th 
Cir. 1987)). 
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conducted, but rather on a litany of hypothetical less-intrusive means the 
city could have used when conducting the search: 
There were a host of simple ways to verify the 
efficacy of the 25,000 character limit (if that, indeed, 
was the intended purpose) without intruding on 
[Quon’s] Fourth Amendment rights. For example, the 
Department could have warned Quon that for the 
month of September he was forbidden from using his 
pager for personal communications, and that the 
contents of all of his messages would be reviewed to 
ensure the pager was used only for work-related 
purposes during that time frame. Alternatively, if the 
Department wanted to review past usage, it could 
have asked Quon to count the characters himself, or 
asked him to redact personal messages and grant 
permission to the Department to review the redacted 
transcript.172 
Based on these alternative, potentially burdensome methods the OPD 
could have utilized to discover the reason for Quon’s regular monthly 
overages, the Ninth Circuit found that reading his messages “was 
excessively intrusive in light of the noninvestigatory object of the 
search.”173  
The issue as to whether the Ninth Circuit panel actually used the 
rejected “least intrusive means” test stands at the center of the 
disagreement between Judge Ikuta, writing for the dissent to rehear Quon 
en banc, and Judge Wardlaw, who concurred in the denial and wrote the 
original panel opinion. Ikuta outright accused the panel of applying the 
rejected test when it concluded that, as a matter of law, the search was 
unreasonable in scope because the city could have used several less 
intrusive means of investigating the efficacy of increasing the monthly 
character limit.174  In Ikuta’s estimation, the use of the Schowengerdt 
“less intrusive means” language, after the Supreme Court explicitly 
                                                                                                             
 172 Id. at 909.  Like any appellate court, the Ninth Circuit Quon panel was confined to 
the jury’s factual findings on the record on appeal and therefore had to assume that 
Scharf’s purpose in conducting the search was to determine whether to increase the 
monthly character allotment, as opposed to the alternative theory that they wanted to 
determine whether Quon was misusing company time by using his pager for personal 
communications.  However, the panel’s analysis of the less-intrusive means the OPD 
could have used, as well as it’s insinuation that the monthly character increase was not 
his actual intended purpose, signals that perhaps the panel did not agree with the jury’s 
finding, and the use of this rejected test allowed them a back door to ultimately finding 
the search unreasonable. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Quon, 554 F.3d at 777 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial to rehear en banc). 
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rejected this standard in Skinner, places too great a burden on the 
government-employer when it conducts a workplace searches.175  
According to Ikuta, the Ninth Circuit’s application of the rejected test 
violates the instruction set forth in Skinner and also ignores the 
underlying spirit of the Ortega plurality’s concern for balancing 
employee and employer interests.176 
Judge Ikuta has the better argument regarding the Quon panel’s 
analysis of the OPD’s search because it is rooted in Supreme Court 
precedent and decisions of the majority of sister circuits.  Arguing 
against Ikuta, Wardlaw contended that the panel used the Schowengerdt 
language because it “relate[d] to the jury's finding that Chief Scharf 
conducted the search for noninvestigatory purposes.”177 Wardlaw 
justified the presence of this “least intrusive means” language in the 
court’s decision by stating that the panel “mentioned other ways the 
[OPD] could have verified the efficacy of the 25,000-character limit 
merely to illustrate our conclusion that the search was ‘excessively 
intrusive’ under Ortega, when measured against the purpose of the 
search as found by the jury.”178 Wardlaw also sought to defend the 
panel’s use of the “least intrusive means” test by stating that the “cases in 
which the Supreme Court has cautioned against employing a ‘least 
intrusive means’ test have often involved circumstances in which the 
government had engaged in years of investigation and study that resulted 
in reasonable conclusions that the government conduct was 
necessary.”179  Furthermore, Wardlaw stated that, unlike cases relied 
upon by the dissent, Quon did “not involve a ‘special needs’ search,” 
making, she argued, the panel’s use of the least intrusive means test 
acceptable.180   
Both of these arguments do not justify the panel’s use of the 
rejected test.  First, while some of the cases in which the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
 175 Judge Ikuta used the language of the Skinner Court to explain why “the panel’s 
approach fits squarely within the Supreme Court’s explanation of why the least intrusive 
means test is not appropriate: ‘[i]t is obvious that the logic of . . . elaborate less-
restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of 
virtually all search-and-seizure powers, because judges engaged in post hoc evaluations 
of government conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the 
objectives of the government might have been accomplished.’” Quon, 554 F.3d at 778 
(Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial to rehear en banc) (quoting Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9). 
 176 Id. at 778. 
 177 Id. at 772. 
 178 Id. at 771. 
 179 Id. at 773 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 
n.9 (1989)). 
 180 Quon, 554 F.3d. at 773.   
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explicitly rejected the test did feature “years of investigation and study,” 
the Court never explicitly stated that, in cases in which no long-term 
study occurs, an employer must use the least intrusive means possible 
when conducting a search.181  Furthermore, Wardlaw erred in stating this 
was not a “special needs” context because, as the Ortega plurality made 
clear, searches conducted by public-sector employers count as “special 
needs” searches that circumvent the normal Fourth Amendment 
requirements for probable cause and search warrants.182 Then, despite 
Wardlaw’s characterizations to the contrary, the panel utilized the 
rejected test.  The Quon decision therefore reflects a departure from 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
in the other circuits.183 
Underlying Ikuta’s concerns—and the central issue at the heart of 
this circuit split—is the potential shift in the balance between employer 
and employee interests embodied by the use of the “least intrusive 
means” test. By employing this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit placed the 
burden on the OPD to exhaust alternative investigations into employee 
conduct before infringing on reasonable privacy expectations.184  The 
Ninth Circuit’s application of the rejected test violates the instruction set 
forth in Skinner and also ignores the concern underlying the Ortega 
plurality’s balance of employee and employer interests.  While the Ninth 
Circuit was correct in its reasoning under the first Ortega prong, its 
litany of “less intrusive means” undercuts the warrantless search purpose 
of the Ortega decision and Justice O’Connor’s concerns that 
“government offices could not function if every employment decision 
became a constitutional matter.”185  While an expansion of workplace 
privacy rights may be beneficial for employees, the use of a least 
intrusive means test and its resulting burdens on employers could 
negatively impact an employer’s ability to monitor workplace efficiency, 
productivity, and safety.186 
Despite the theoretical burden the Ninth Circuit has placed on 
employers by utilizing the “least intrusive means” test, this split may not 
                                                                                                             
 181 While the factual scenarios in the background of many of the decisions in which 
the Supreme Court has rejected the “least intrusive means” test do feature “years of 
investigation and study,” the Court has never explicitly stated that it has rejected the use 
of this burdensome standard based on the fact that general studies have been conducted. 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629. The Court did not base its rejection of the test on that, and its 
subsequent decisions rejecting the “least intrusive means” test feature factual scenarios 
that do not center on “years of investigation and study.” See supra Part III.C. 
 182 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722. See also supra Part III.C. 
 183 See supra Part III. 
 184 Green, supra note 10, at 369. 
 185 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). 
 186 See Quon, 554 F.3d at 778 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial to rehear en banc). 
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have any lasting implications for employee privacy rights. Before 
inquiring into the reasonableness of an employer’s search, a court must 
always first locate a reasonable privacy interest on the part of the 
employee.187  As discussed above, while the Ninth Circuit found the 
employee’s expectation to be reasonable in the context of his workplace, 
the decision stands as an example of a careless employer who did not 
practice its anti-privacy policy, and future employers now have notice to 
avoiding a similar result.188  If employers now have notice to conduct 
routine surveillance and render unreasonable employee expectations of 
privacy, the Quon decision suggests that employees may rarely have a 
reasonable privacy expectation in the future. If employees do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace, then employers may 
conduct whatever searches they want, regardless of whether they use the 
least intrusive means possible. Quon, then, may ultimately represent the 
limitations inherent in the current workplace privacy framework and 
perhaps signals that the tension between employer and employee privacy 
interests must be confronted not by judge-made law but by legislators. 
V. SHOULD WORKPLACE PRIVACY BE LEFT TO PRIVATE ORDERING? 
The impassioned disagreement raised by the en banc denial, 
sparking debate between Judges Ikuta and Wardlaw, demonstrates that 
the Ortega contextual methodology, as Justice Scalia predicted, leads to 
uncertainty and confusion.189 Additionally, the Ortega test’s focus on the 
context of a given workplace has provided the opportunity for 
employers, who structure how an office operates, to diminish employee 
privacy expectations.190  Several commentators suggest that these flaws 
in the Ortega framework present insurmountable obstacles to ensuring 
substantive workplace privacy protection and that judges should find 
alternative means to analyze Fourth Amendment workplace privacy 
violations.191  
                                                                                                             
 187 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 716. 
 188 Schreiber, supra note 164. 
 189 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 729–30 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 190 See Hanson, supra note 102. Hanson describes the Ortega framework as 
presenting two insurmountable limitations for employees. Id. at 245–46. First, the 
framework, originally meant as an exception to the probable cause warrant requirement, 
allows employers to conduct searches instead of police officers, who are constrained by 
societal norms and formal procedural restrictions. Id. Second, Hanson sees the 
requirement that, upon a finding of a privacy expectation, the government’s search be 
“reasonable” as overly deferential to the government. Id. 
 191 Hanson suggests that courts should apply a property-based analysis to Fourth 
Amendment workplace privacy claims. Under this approach, she suggests that courts 
would have a “bright-line, objective definition of Fourth Amendment protection largely 
beyond an employer's control” and “the property rights focus functions as a fairly good 
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Ultimately, by allowing a workplace context to define the privacy 
right an employee may enjoy in a society in which “[t]echnological and 
communication advances mean that much of everyday life is now 
recorded by someone somewhere,” the Court has perhaps diminished 
Brandeis’ conception of the essential “right to be left alone.”192  Scalia’s 
categorical approach may have ensured a more dependable or predictable 
privacy protection for employees, but the Supreme Court has made clear 
that the context of a workplace will define what an employee can expect 
regarding his right to workplace privacy, and that is simply the current 
state of the law. 
Despite the fact that the Ortega framework allows employers to 
have their cake and eat it too, perhaps the Ortega plurality had it right all 
along and private ordering should rule the day, with employers dictating 
the terms of a workplace context and that context defining the limits of 
what privacy employees can expect to enjoy.  The concept of allowing 
private ordering to ultimately dictate the parameters of workplace 
privacy finds a basis in what Professor Scott Sundby refers to as the true 
underlying metaphor or guiding principle of the Fourth Amendment: 
                                                                                                             
proxy for what the government does not legitimately need and should not be able to get, 
clearly delineating what should fall outside of ‘legitimate’ internal governance concerns.” 
Hanson, supra note 102, at 264. This approach, while delineating clearer distinctions 
between precisely what is protected would prove problematic when applied to laptops, 
cell phones and BlackBerries, which are owned by employers but used outside the office, 
making them even more likely to contain personal information.   
Professor Stephen Schulhofer argues that workplace searches should be allowed without 
probable cause or a warrant only if pressing health and safety concerns are at issue, or if 
there are “internal governance imperatives,” a standard similar to the noninvestigatory, 
work-related searches allowed to ferret out misconduct by the Ortega plurality. 
Schulhofer is concerned primarily with workplace drug tests, and, while his standard 
would provide more rigorous protection of employee bodily integrity, the standard would 
still provide great deference to government-employer interests and would therefore not 
differ greatly from the Ortega approach.  Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth 
Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 90–123 (1989). 
In examining the general values at stake when the government seeks to obtain 
information or conduct a search, Professor Christopher Slobogin has re-imagined what 
privacy jurisprudence would look like without the Fourth Amendment.  In its place, 
Slobogin proposes a new federal scheme, developed on the basis of various state and 
individual interests that inform the regulation of government searches and seizures.  At 
the heart of Slobogin’s theoretical proposal lies some sort of ex ante review of searches 
and seizures.  Pertinent to the “special needs” exception of workplace searches, Slobogin 
bases his proposal of this ex ante review on an “exigency principle,” requiring the 
government to obtain third party authorization from a lay decision maker prior to any 
nonemergency search or seizure (the “exigency principle”).  As part of the substantive 
component of this hypothetical replacement scheme, Slobogin would mandate that the 
level of certainty required to authorize a particular search or seizure should be roughly 
proportional to the level of its intrusiveness. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a 
Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11–47 (1991). 
 192 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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trust between the government and private citizens.193  Although the “the 
notion of trust sounds, and is in many ways, so simple, so nonlegalistic, 
and so nonphilosophical, that it risks being dismissed as not sufficiently 
grounded in legal-political theory,” Sundby argues that this metaphor 
asks the one essential question concerning government intrusions into the 
individual’s sphere of privacy: “is the government’s action inconsistent 
with trusting the citizenry to behave in a lawful and responsible 
fashion?”194 
While Sundby focuses his exploration of trust-as-metaphor on all 
aspects of government intrusions and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
it finds strong echoes in the dilemma of balancing employer and 
employee interests, as exemplified by the Quon decision.  Sundby 
focuses on the government’s need for implicit trust of the citizenry, but 
this metaphor should be turned on its head in the workplace context: as 
the Quon decision demonstrates, employers and employees have ample 
reasons for mutual distrust, with employers suspecting employees of 
laziness and wrongdoing, and employees suspecting employers invade 
personal communications on workplace technology. 
Perhaps Quon can teach the lesson that workplaces should be based 
on mutual distrust.  If employers distrust employees to some degree and 
assume they require some amount of monitoring, then employees should 
likewise distrust that employers deserve to know their personal 
information. If employees then know that that they are being watched 
due to ample notice about technology surveillance, they can accordingly 
structure their behavior and refrain from divulging personal information 
on workplace technology. Regardless, the Ortega framework, and its 
deference to employer interests in monitoring, indicates that, despite 
being watched, perhaps employees should trust employers anyway. 
While employers do conduct surveillance on workplace technology, in 
most cases they will not necessarily indulge in unreasonable searches, as 
creating an Orwellian workplace will negatively impact employee 
morale.195   
If the goal is to ensure healthy workplace relationships between 
employers and employees, one compromise to the problem of satisfying 
both parties’ interests and expectations could center on workplace 
                                                                                                             
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 1791. 
195 See David Smith, Case Note, Search and Seizure: O'Connor v. Ortega, “He Hit Me 
First!,” 56 UMKC L. REV. 411, 418–19 (1988) (noting that employers would refrain 
from most objectionable searches because “[a]n environment which makes an employee 
feel that he or she has no privacy would be counter-productive. Therefore, it stands to 
reason that employers only search an office on official business since ad hoc searches 
would destroy the healthy work environment employers strive so hard to attain.”). 
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privacy legislation requiring disclosure.  Because the current state of the 
law allows employers to conduct any surveillance depending on the 
context of the workplace, employers should place employees on 
meaningful notice when conducting workplace surveillance. As Quon’s 
workplace demonstrated, sometimes a workplace context can send mixed 
messages, and employers should bear the responsibility of sending a 
clear, unmistakable signal that employees may be monitored and all 
employees should refrain from sending private communications on 
employer-provided technology.  If employees are provided with such 
notice, then they will at least have a meaningful choice as to whether 
they will only use employer-provided technology for work-related 
purposes or whether they will risk sending personal communications on 
workplace laptops or BlackBerries despite the possibility of being 
watched by their employers. 
Fairness dictates, for example, that employers who provide laptops, 
cell phones or BlackBerries should provide general and ongoing 
surveillance warnings to employees in order to constantly discourage any 
personal use of technology.196  This not only reserves for the employer 
the right to keep track of its own technology but also puts the employee 
on reasonable notice as to monitoring.  Collection, use, or disclosure of 
personal information should normally be done only with an employee’s 
knowledge and consent, with a warning screen acknowledging 
surveillance every time an employee signs on to a computer or laptop.197  
Employers should give employees access to the personal information 
held about them, so that they can verify and, if necessary, challenge its 
accuracy and completeness.198 
Employees like Quon must be provided with meaningful notice, so 
they have awareness that they are being watched and will therefore keep 
                                                                                                             
 196 One commentator suggests that legislators should create laws that “provide clarity 
on notice and consent requirements, delineate appropriate use and lifetime of data, and 
afford an employee the capacity to correct false data,” Laura Evans, Monitoring 
Technology in the American Workplace: Would Adopting English Privacy Standards 
Better Balance Employee Privacy and Productivity?, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1115, 1144 
(2007).  Another commentator suggests that potential solutions include providing 
meaningful remedies against the misuse or abuse of electronic surveillance by employers, 
and additionally requiring employers to advise employees each time the employer 
accesses their computer system, giving written notice to employees prior to instituting a 
monitoring program, articulating a legitimate business reason for implementation of a 
policy, or only getting information on a “need to know” basis. Michael L. Rustad & 
Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-Mail and Internet Usage: Avoiding the 
Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. 829, 
899–900 (2005). 
 197 See 10-272 Matthew Bender & Company Inc., Labor and Employment Law § 
272.06. (2008). 
 198 Id. 
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personal information private.  If both players know the rules of the game, 
and each can mutually distrust the other enough so that employers 
routinely conduct surveillance and employees know enough to refrain 
from communicating personal information on workplace technology, 
then employers and employees will reach an imperfect solution to the 
quandary of serving both their interests concerning workplace privacy.199 
On the one hand, employers will be able to continue monitoring 
employee productivity, efficiency and compliance.  On the other, by 
having meaningful notice not to divulge all that juicy information about 
their adulterous relationships and general bad behavior on those 
insidious, employer-provided BlackBerries, employees will retain a 
Brandeis-quality sphere of privacy and autonomy in which their 
employers cannot intrude. 
                                                                                                             
199 See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 555 (1992). This proposed model, based on both sides 
being on the same page, for notice regarding monitoring to prevent workplace privacy 
violations has echoes of the Fourth Amendment theories of Professor William Stuntz, 
who posits that the Court’s use of the “special needs” exception should be analogized to 
the law of contracts, indicating that an implicit bargain between government-employers 
and public-sector employees exists in the background of workplace searches.  Id. at 554. 
Viewing the Fourth Amendment through the lens of contract law, Stuntz believes the 
“Court’s ‘special needs’ decisions have it about right” because, in the context of “special 
needs” searches, the government and the citizen have a relationship independent of the 
search; the government has alternative options it could pursue if a search would violate 
the Fourth Amendment, such as punishment or discharge; and these searches spread 
benefits to innocent search targets by ferreting out wrongdoing and streamlining 
inefficiencies. Id. at 555. Basically, Stuntz believes that an implicit bargain between 
citizens and the government exists in the background of any search conducted in the 
“special needs” exceptions contexts of government workplaces, public schools and 
regulated businesses. Id. He believes this because “rational people in the position of these 
search targets would likely agree to such a regime,” as they “get something in return: a 
reduced likelihood that the government will exercise other, worse alternatives.” Id.  He 
explains that if the government and the public-sector worker were to negotiate a rule for 
workplace searches in advance, this type of negotiation “would reflect the parties’ 
understanding of the whole relationship, and their mutual awareness that the government 
often has alternatives to searching. Id. 
